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lABOR OR ANTITRUST? LET THE PLAYERS CHOOSE 
RoBERT A McCoRMICK* 
Over the past twenty-five years, questions surrounding the na-
ture and scope of the nonstatutory labor exemption have been piv-
otal in the many important antitrust challenges to player restraint 
mechanisms in professional team sports. 1 Recendy, the issue of the 
exemption's duration has given rise to important litigation2 and sig-
nificant academic disagreement. 3 
In June 1996, the United States Supreme Court decided Brown 
v. Pro-Football, Inc.,4 which addressed the critical question posed in 
professional sports and labor-management relations regarding the 
duration of the nonstatutory labor exemption to the antitrust laws. 5 
* Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University. This 
Article grows out of a speech delivered at a symposium on labor relations in profes-
sional sports sponsored by the VILLANovA SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENT LAw JouRNAL 
in March, 1996. 
1. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976)(challenging 
validy of professional football league draft and its surrounding restrictions), affd 
in part & rcu'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Mackey v. National Football 
League, 407 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975)(challenging validity of clause under 
National Football League constitution which restricted acquisition of free agents), 
affd in part & rcu'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976); Robertson v. National 
Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (challenging professional bas-
ketball league restrictions such as reserve clause, uniform player contracts, and 
college draft), affd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977); Kapp v. National Football 
League, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (challenging several rules of National 
Football League as unreasonable restraints on trade), affd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th 
Cir. 1978); Boston Profl Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261 (D. Mass.) 
(involving action brought against hockey players who signed contracts with clubs 
in newly organized league), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1972); Philadelphia 
World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. 
Pa. 1972) (involving enforcement or threatened enforcement of reserve clause by 
established major professional hockey league to prevent players from playing in 
new league). 
2. See, e.g., National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 
1995) (concluding that nonstatutory labor exemption precluded antitrust chal-
lenge to continued imposition of terms of agreement after impasse was reached); 
Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding nonstat-
utory labor exemption from antitrust laws extends beyond impasse); Bridgeman v. 
National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.NJ. 1987) (holding collective bar-
gaining agreements do not lose antitrust immunity upon expiration of agreement 
but cannot continue indefinitely beyond expiration of agreement). 
3. For a discussion on the academic disagreement on the issue of labor ex-
emption to the antitrust laws, see infra notes 17, 36-40 and accompanying text. 
4. 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996). 
5. See, e.g., id. at 2120. For a discussion of the nonstatutory labor exemption, 
see infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the statutory labor 
(39) 
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In Brown, the Court answered the specific question as to whether 
the labor exemption continues to insulate a labor issue from anti-
trust examination even after a collective bargaining agreement has 
expired and the union and employers have reached an impasse in 
negotiations.6 This Article will analyze the Brown decision.7 
The implications of Brown are significant and this Article will 
discuss some of them.8 This Article will conclude that the central 
teaching of Brown is that the nonstatutory labor exemption protects 
the collective bargaining process, with all its virtues and flaws, from 
antitrust scrutiny. It will also sound a warning for the federal courts 
overseeing labor-management conflicts in professional sports that 
the players must decide whether labor law or antitrust law will 
shape the future of employment relations in professional sports. If 
the players choose to do so, as they have done in the past, they may 
elect to be represented by unions. Under those circumstances, the 
players' terms of employment would be governed by labor law. On 
the other hand, players may forego union representation and 
thereby elect individual negotiations with the teams. If the players 
choose that option, antitrust principles would apply to their em-
ployment terms. The courts must not permit labor or management 
to distort collective bargaining by providing either party with the 
advantages of both avenues for redress. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The conflict between labor and management in professional 
sports is among the most fascinating of such contests in all of em-
ployment law. It involves not only the inherent struggle between 
labor and capital,9 but also because lurking, ever near, is the brood-
exemptions, see Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975) (noting 
that Clayton Act and Norris-Laguardia Act declare that labor unions are not com-
binations or conspiracies in restraint of trade and exempt specific union activities, 
including secondary picketing and boycotts from operation of antitrust laws). See 
also Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 
676 ( 1965) (holding that multi-employer agreement with unions not to sell meat 
between 6 p.m. and 9 a.m. even in self-service markets was within labor exemption 
of Sherman Act); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 
(1965) (holding that agreements between labor and management to impose terms 
on third parties fall outside labor exemption and may well violate antitrust laws). 
6. Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (1996). 
7. For a discussion of the Brown decision, see infra notes 26-62 and accompa-
nying text. 
8. For a discussion on the implications of Brown, see infra notes 63-70 and 
accompanying text. 
9. As Justice Holmes wrote, "(o]ne of the eternal conflicts out of which life is 
made up is that between the effort of every man to get the most he can for his 
services, and that of society, disguised under the name of capital, to get his services 
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ing presence of antitrust law. This mix of labor and antitrust has 
always been, and will always be, volatile because labor policy and 
antitrust policy are, in some ways, inherently in conflict.10 This con-
flict arises because the purpose of antitrust policy is to foster eco-
nomic competition, 11 while one important purpose of organized 
labor is to limit such competition among individual employees in 
the labor market.I2 
Organized labor limits competition because unions regularly 
seek agreements with employers that establish uniform terms and 
thereby limit the opportunity of any individual employee to sell his 
or her services for the most favorable terms. 13 Typical collective 
bargaining objectives, such as standardized wages and seniority sys-
tems, have anticompetitive effects for both younger and more 
highly skilled employees. At the same time, because such subjects 
are also mandatory subjects of bargaining under the National La-
bor Relations Act (NLRA),14 they are plainly matters about which 
national labor policy encourages agreement.15 
for the least possible retum." Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 
1896) (Holmes,]., dissenting). 
10. See Brawn, 116 S. Ct. at 2122. For a discussion of the inherent conflict 
between labor policy and antitrust policy, see infra notes 13-18 and accompanying 
text. 
11. SeeNorthem Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)("The Sher-
man Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade .... "); Allen Brad-
ley Co. v. Local Union No.3, Intemational Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 325 
U.S. 797, 806 (1945) (stating that "[Antitrust policy] ... seeks to preserve a competi-
tive business economy .... ");LAWRENCE A SuLLIVAN, HANoBOOK OF THE LAw OF 
ANrrrR.usT 14 (1977)(stating "[t]he purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote 
competition and to inhibit monopoly and restraints upon freedom of trade in all 
sectors of the economy to which these laws apply."). See also Clarence Fried & 
William H. Crabtree, Labor, 33 ANrrrR.usT LJ. 38 (1967) (tracing history of labor 
exemption to antitrust laws). 
12. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
"This Court has recognized that a legitimate aim of any national labor organiza-
tion is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a consequence of such 
union activity may be to eliminate competition based on differences in such stan-
dards." /d. at 666. 
13. See, e.g., id. In Pennington, small coal mine operators sued the coal miner's 
union on the basis of an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement whereby 
the employers and union agreed on a wage scale that exceeded the financial ability 
of some operators to pay. See id. This agreement was found to have been made for 
the purpose of forcing some employers out of business. See id. 
14. See Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea Co., 381 
U.S. 676, 685 (1965). Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), an em-
ployer or union has the duty to bargain in good faith conceming "wages, hours, 
and other terms and conditions of employment." /d. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158 
(1994)(as amended)). 
15. Section 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) reads in pertinent 
part: 
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In light of this inherent conflict, if the natural anticompetitive 
objectives of unions are to be accepted and protected, then restric-
tions on the free operation of the labor market must follow. As 
Professor St. Antoine has so nicely written, "we have long since con-
cluded that the value of unions in our society makes them worth 
promoting. Having made that judgment, we must be prepared to 
abide by some of the consequences."16 
The relationship between antitrust policy and labor policy in 
professional sports is something like a contentious marriage; the 
two live together, but they cannot get along. 17 The Supreme Court 
aptly recognized this contentious marriage when it observed: 
We have two declared congressional policies which it is 
our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to 
preserve a competitive business economy; the other to pre-
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(!) To interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in 
section 7. (2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administra-
tion of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to 
it: Provided, That subject to mles and regulations made and published by 
the Board pursuant to section 6 (a), an employer shall not be prohibited 
from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours 
without loss of time or pay. (3) By discrimination in regard to hire or 
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to en-
courage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, 
That nothing in this Act, or in the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(U.S.C., Supp. VII, title 15, sees. 701-712), as amended from time to time, 
or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer 
from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, 
maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an unfair labor 
practice) to require as a condiditon of employment membership therein, 
if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as pro-
vided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit cov-
ered by such agreement when made. 
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994)(emphasis in original). 
16. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Connell: Antitrust Law at the Expense of Labor Law, 
62 VA. L. REv. 603, 631 (1976) (discussing outlines of antitrust law as it relates to 
labor field and concluding that unions and antitrust laws are premised on funda-
mentally opposing philosophies of competition). 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (194l)(holding Sher-
man, Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts must be considered jointly in arriving at 
conclusion as to whether labor union activities run counter to antitrust legisla-
tion); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940) (holding labor unions 
are still subject to Sherman Act to "some extent not defined."); Powell v. National 
Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussing scope of nonstatutory 
labor exemption); Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 962 (2d Cir. 
1987)("[a]ny claim of unreasonable bargaining behavior must be pursued in an 
unfair labor practice proceeding charging a refusal to bargain in good faith, ... 
not in an action under the Sherman Act."); Mackey v. National Football League, 
543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing application of nonstatutory labor 
exemption in professional sports and restrictions on free agency). 
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seiVe the rights oflabor to organize to better its conditions 
through the agency of collective bargaining. We must de-
termine here how far Congress intended activities under 
one of these policies to neutralize the results envisioned 
by the other. 18 
43 
How are these two opposing doctrines to be reconciled? Such 
reconciliation is achieved by invocation of the so-called nonstatutory 
labor exemption 19 to the antitrust laws, a common law doctrine cre-
ated by the Supreme Court. The exemption is designed to establish 
the circumstances under which certain otherwise anticompetitive 
agreements between labor and management will be insulated from 
antitrust interdiction by virtue of their place in collective 
bargaining.20 
What kinds of agreements qualify for this exemption? Gener-
ally speaking, the Supreme Court has determined that agreements 
which primarily affect the parties to the agreement are to be gov-
erned solely by labor law principles and not antitrust principles. 
Such agreements are part of mandatory bargaining under the 
18. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, lnt'l Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 806 (1965). 
19. The nonstatutory labor exemption, as its name denotes, should be distin-
guished from the exemption accorded specific unilateral union activities under 
sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act. Ch. 323, §§ 6, 20, 38 Stat. 730, 731, 738 
(1914)(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994) and 29 U.S.C. §52 (1994)). Judicial re-
view of congressional efforts to create an antitrust exemption for labor has limited 
the statutory exemption to specific unilateral union activities. See, e.g., Connell 
Constr. Co. v. Plumb~rs 421 U.S. 616, 622-26 (1975) (concluding multi-employer 
collective bargaining agreement was not entitled to antitrust exemption because it 
· placed direct restraints on subcontractor competition); United States v. Hutche-
son, 312 U.S. 219, 233-37 (1941) (concluding that conventional union activities di-
rected at rival union are not prohibited by antitrust laws). Cf Milton Handler & 
William C. Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of 
the Labor Exemption, 81 CoLuM. L. REv. 459, 475-83 (1981) (discussing Supreme 
Court cases interpreting statutory exemption). See also United Mine Workers of 
Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965) (concluding that attempt to im-
pose industry-wide standards in negotiated agreement with employer would not be 
entitled to statutory antitrust exemption). 
As early as 1941, however, the Supreme Court recognized in United States v. 
Hutcheson that accommodating antitrust and labor policy required some labor-
management agreements be accorded a nonstatutory exemption from the anti-
trust laws. See Hutcheson 312 at 233-37 (discussing broad legislative purpose behind 
enactment of labor statutes). 
As Justice Goldberg observed, to do otherwise would permit unions and em-
ployers to conduct "industrial warfare" but would prohibit them from peacefully 
resolving their disputes. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel 
Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 712 (1965)(Goldberg,J., dissenting). 
20. See Handler & Zifchak, supra note 19 at 475-86 (following progression of 
common law labor exception to antitrust laws). 
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NLRA, dealing namely with wages, hours and other terms and con-
ditions of employment.21 
Why does this conflict between labor and antitrust policy arise 
so often in professional sports? At the risk of noting the obvious, 
sports leagues, from the first playground basketball or baseball 
game to professional organizations, restrain trade by allocating tal-
ented players among teams and discouraging their subsequent 
movement. The justification for this restraint rests upon the need 
to provide for an athletic contest, the outcome of which will be in 
doubt. Without such uncertainty, there would be no real drama 
and the incredible appeal of competitive athletic contests would be 
jeopardized. 
Allocating players among teams and discouraging their subse-
quent movement requires some agreement among teams to re-
strain themselves when attempting to acquire the most talented 
employees available. Such agreements, however, are highly likely to 
be contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and 
thus in appar~nt violation of the Sherman Act.22 
At the same time, a majority of players in all professional 
sports leagues have decided to be represented collectively by unions 
known as players' associations.23 In so doing, those players have 
elected to use the leverage of collective bargaining and the threat 
of strikes in order to achieve the ends they desire. Having so elec-
ted, they must be prepared to abide by the consequences of this 
decision. 
The result of this mix of labor and antitrust in professional 
sports provides for a rich compost that will inevitably ferment and 
create heat. Over the past quarter century, all significant antitrust 
challenges to player restraint mechanisms24 have involved the ques-
tion of whether these mechanisms are exempt from antitrust review 
by virtue of the nonstatutory labor exemption.25 
21. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). 
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). "Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .... " Id. 
23. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996). 
24. See, e.g., Powell v. National Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 
1989) (discussing scope of nonstatutory labor exemption); Mackey v. National 
Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976)(discussing application of non-
statutory labor exemption in professional sports and restrictions on free agency). 
See also NFL Management Council & National Football League Players Association, 
1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement arts. XII-XVI, at 28-45. 
25. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
HeinOnline -- 4 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 45 1997
1997] LABoR OR ANTITRusT? 45 
II. BROWN v. PRO-FOOTBALL, INC. 
In Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 26 the latest manifestation of the 
labor-antitru.st conflict in professional sports, the Supreme Court 
addressed the duration of the nonstatutory labor exemption. The 
circumstances giving rise to Brown began in 1987 when the profes-
sional football players, represented by the National Football League 
Players' Association (NFLPA), engaged in a brief work stoppage af-
ter their collective bargaining agreement with the National Football 
League (NFL or the League) expired and negotiations for a new 
contract proved unsuccessful.27 ~en the players were replaced 
and games continued uninterrupted, veteran players began to cross 
the picket line, and within three weeks the NFLPA capitulated.28 
Thereafter, the players played for six years, until 1993, without a 
successor contract.29 
In 1987, when the existing collective bargaining agreement ex-
pired, the League and the NFLPA began to negotiate a new agree-
ment. 30 Mter long negotiations, 31 the NFL implemented one of 
the proposals it made during negotiations- a $1000 per week sal-
ary cap for the so-called "developmental squad" players.32 The uni-
lateral implementation of this proposal, which was consistent with 
the League's offer to the NFLPA during bargaining, was entirely 
permissible under the NLRA as one of the rules of bargaining. 33 
26. 116 S. Ct 2116 (1996). 
27. See Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Dur-
ing the course of collective bargaining between the NFL and the NFLPA, the NFL 
proposed to pay a fixed salary of $1000 per week to any player assigned to newly 
formed practice squads. See id. The parties did not reach settlement on this issue 
and therefore the proposed salary was not fixed for any player assigned to these 
squads. See id. The parties bargained to impasse over the issue and the clubs con-
sequently imposed the fixed salary for the 1989 NFL season. See id. 
28. See id. 
29. See id. at 1047 n.3. 
30. See Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct 2116, 2119 (1996). 
31. For a discussion of the negotiations underlying the Bruum. case, see supra 
note 27. 
32. See Bruum, 50 F.3d at 1045. Had the parties been able to reach a settle-
ment on this issue, they could have concluded an agreement establishing $1000 
per week as the salary for practice squad players, and this agreement would have 
posed no legal problems under the federal labor or antitrust laws. See id. Such was 
not the case and the parties bargained to impasse over the issue. See id. 
33. See Storer Communications, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 1056, 1090 (1989) (stating 
employers may implement reasonably comprehended changes after impasse); Taft 
Broad. Co., 163 N.L.R.B 475, 478 (1967) (stating "after bargaining to an impasse, 
that is, after good-faith negotiations have exhausted the prospects of concluding 
an agreement, an employer does not violate the Act by making unilateral changes 
that are reasonably comprehended within his pre-impasse proposals."), enforced, 
395 F.2d 622 (C.A.D.C. 1968). See also NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 745 & n.12 
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Anthony Brown and the other 235 developmental squad play-
ers sued the League on antitrust grounds, claiming that the $1000 
salary cap was unlawfully anticompetitive.34 Should Brown have 
been permitted to challenge the agreement among team owners to 
limit developmental player salaries as a violation of the antitrust 
laws? It was obviously anticompetitive and, but for the labor exemp-
tion, very likely unlawful. 
Courts and commentators have suggested many alternatives as 
to how long the labor exemption should shelter anticompetitive ar-
rangements.35 Some have taken the position that the exemption 
should be coextensive with the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment.36 Others have argued that the exemption should end at im-
passe37 or "modified impasse."38 Still others have suggested that 
the exemption should apply until it is "clearly unreasonable" for 
the parties to believe the disputed provision will appear "in that 
form in the succeeding agreement."39 Thus if the exemption con-
tinued past the time impasse was reached, then the challenge to the 
(1962) (stating that employer could institute wage increase unilaterally that was in-
dentical to that which union rejected during impasse). 
34. See Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Nine 
players who had been assigned to practice squads filed this class action antitrust 
lawsuit against the clubs and the NFL in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, alleging that the fixed salary constituted an unreasonable 
restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. See id. 
35. For a discussion of the case law on the labor exemption, see supra notes 2-
6 and accompanying text. 
36. See Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Lahar Exemption in Professional Spurts, 1989 
DuKE LJ. 339, 395-400. 
37. See Ethan Lock, Powell v. National Football League: The Eighth Circuit Sacks 
the National FootbaU League Players Association, 67 DENV. U.L. REv. 135, 153 
(1990) (arguing in absence of antitrust exemption, NFL's current system of free 
agency violates antitrust law); Daniel C. Nester, Comment, Lahar Exemption to Anti-
trust Scrutiny in Professional Spurts, 15 S. ILL. U.LJ. 123, 144 (1990)(explaining si-
multaneous expiration of labor exemption with collective bargaining agreement 
provides unstable environment for negotiations because employers fear antitrust 
liability); Note, Releasing Superstars from Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory 
Labar Exemption, 104 HARv. L. REv. 874, 888-94 (1991) (suggesting labor exemption 
should expire at same time as collective bargaining agreement that spawned it); 
Jonathan S. Shapiro, Note, Warming the Bench: The Nonstatutory Labar Exemption in 
the National Football League, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1203, 1233 (1993) (stating that 
ending exemption at impasse appears to be best judicially recognized alternative 
because it provides incentives for parties to negotiate, without giving either side 
excessive bargaining power). 
38. See Bradley R Cahoon, Note, Powell v. National Football League: Modified 
Impasse Standard Determines Scope of Labar Exemption, 1990 UTAH L. REv. 381, 401-06. 
39. Kieren M. Corcoran, Note, When Does the Bw:.zer Sound?: The Nonstatutory 
Labar Exemption in Professional Spurts, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 1045, 1071-75 (1994). See 
also Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D.NJ. 
1987) (holding player restraining system would be exempt from antitrust scrutiny 
so long as owners left system unchanged and so long as owners "reasonably be-
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League's action would plainly be foreclosed; if not, then the 
League's antitrust liability was patent. The Brown case would pro-
vide the vehicle for ultimate resolution of the question. 
A. The Lower Court Decisions 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
held that the suit was not barred by the labor exemption. 40 The 
court found for the plaintiffs and entered ajudgment of more than 
$30 million against the NFL.41 On appeal the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the lower 
court, holding that "the nonstatutory labor exemption waives anti-
trust liability for restraints on competition imposed through the col-
lective bargaining process, so long as such restraints operate 
primarily in a labor market .... "42 In so holding, the court of 
appeals sought "to shield the entire collective bargaining process 
established by federallaw."43 
On appeal the players argued that because federal labor laws 
are designed to foster employee rights to collectively bargain, a col-
lective bargaining agreement ought to be a precondition to the ex-
emption.44 The court recognized, however, that the collective 
bargaining process envisions much more than parties successfully 
reaching agreements.45 Thus, in Brown the court of appeals held 
that under the NLRA, ·"the right to engage in collective bargaining 
does not encompass the right of agreement."46 Specifically, it ruled 
lieve[d] that the practice or a close variant of it will be incorporated in the next 
collective bargaining agreement."). 
40. See Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C. 1991). 
41. See Civ. Action No. 90-1071 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1992) (judgment on the ver-
dict). The district court also granted the players' request for a permanent injunc-
tion barring the clubs from ever again setting a uniform regular season salary for 
any category of players. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 
1993). 
42. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
43. Id. at 1051. The court noted that the National Labor Relations Act makes 
clear that federal labor policy focuses on collective bargaining as a process, rather 
than on collective bargaining agreements alone. See id. Thus, federal labor policy 
favors neither party to the collective bargaining, but instead stocks the arsenals of 
both unions and employers with economic weapons of roughly equal power and 
leaves each side to its own devices. See id. 
44. See id. at 1051-52. 
45. See id. 
46. Id. The court noted that some commentators have suggested that union 
agreement ought to be a precondition to any invocation of the nonstatutory labor 
exemption, but that this is not in fact required. See id. The NLRA protects the 
right to join and form unions, but federal labor law has always expressed a "policy 
of voluntary unionism." See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. 
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that under the NLRA, an employer may unilaterally implement its 
pre-impasse proposals after good faith impasse has been reached.47 
In her dissent, Judge Wald pointed out that one effect of the 
majority's decision is that employees who choose to be repre-
sented by unions forfeit their antitrust rights.48 She correctly ob-
served, " [ t] hus, employees must now choose between foregoing 
collective bargaining altogether, thereby retaining antitrust 
protection against employer restraints on the labor market; or en-
gaging in collective bargaining at the risk of forfeiting all antitrust 
remedies if bargaining fails and the employers unilaterally foist un-
agreed-to industry-wide terms upon them."49 
In a very real sense, Judge Wald's observation is precisely the 
point of this Article. Antitrust law is inimical to the collective bar-
gaining process and thus the players must choose how they wish to 
order their employment relationship. If they choose to negotiate 
collectively, as they have thus far done, then in exchange for the 
advantages of collective action, they must be prepared to forego 
antitrust review of their employment terms. On the other hand, if 
they elect to negotiate with their employers individually and relin-
quish the advantages of collective action, then the antitrust laws will 
be available to them. The choice is theirs. 
B. The Supreme Court's Analysis 
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision 
which it characterized as consistent with "both history and logic."50 
As a matter of history, the Court reasoned, the nonstatutory labor 
exemption "substitutes legislative and administrative labor-related 
determinations for judicial antitrust-related determinations as to 
the appropriate legal limits of industrial conflict."51 As a matter of 
logic, the Court wrote, "it would be difficult, if not impossible" to 
require employers and employees to bargain together, but at the 
same time to forbid them from making agreements "potentially 
necessary to make the process work."52 
§§ 141-187 (1994) [hereinafter LMRA]. Thus, employees have an equal right to 
join or refrain from joining unions and engaging in collective bargaining. See id. 
47. See Broum, 50 F.3d at 1051 (citing NLRB v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 
964 F.2d 1153, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). 
48. See Brawn, 50 F.3d at 1058 (Wald, J., dissenting). 
49. /d. (Wald, J., dissenting). 
50. Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2120 (1996). 
51. /d. 
52. /d. 
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Covering some of the same territory reviewed by the District of 
Columbia Circuit, the Supreme Court observed that labor law per-
mits employers unilaterally to implement changes in the status quo 
after reaching an impasse in bargaining, as the NFL did in Brown, 
so long as those changes are "reasonably comprehended" within 
the employer's pre-impasse proposals.53 Moreover, the Court 
noted, this same principle applies to multi-employer bargaining 
units like the NFL. The Court summarized its findings nicely when 
it wrote: 
In these circumstances, to subject the practice to antitrust 
law is to require antitrust courts to answer a host of impor-
tant practical questions about how collective bargaining 
over wages, hours and working conditions is to proceed -
the very result that the implicit labor exemption seeks to 
avoid. And it is to place in jeopardy some of the poten-
tially beneficial labor-related effects that multiemployer 
bargaining can achieve. That is because unlike labor law, 
which sometimes welcomes anticompetitive agreements 
conducive to industrial harmony, antitrust law forbids all 
agreements among competitors (such as competing em-
ployers) that unreasonably lessen competition among or 
between them in virtually any respect whatsoever. 54 
The Court then listed the practical problems which would re-
sult from the application of antitrust laws to collective bargaining 
agreements. 55 Most importandy, the Court queried, if the antitrust 
laws apply after impasse is reached, what should employers do when 
negotiations are not fruitful?56 If employers continued to impose 
terms similar to those offered in bargaining, "they invite an anti-
trust action premised upon identical behavior."57 If, on the other 
hand, they individually impose terms that differ significandy from 
those contained in the offer, "they invite an unfair labor practice 
53. /d. at 2121. Employers may not unilaterally impose terms which are more 
or less favorable than their pre-impasse proposals, because such imposition would 
undermine the union's status. See id. (citing Storer Communications, Inc. 294 
NLRB 1056, 1090 (1989); Taft Broad. Co., 163 NLRB 475,478 (1967), enforced, 395 
F.2d 622 (C.A.D.C. 1968); National Labor Relations Board v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 
745 & n.12 (1962)). The Court noted that such proposals are "typically the last 
rejected proposals" offered by the employer. /d. 
54. Id. at 2122. 
55. See Bruwn, 116 S. Ct. at 2122-23. 
56. See id. at 2123. 
57. Id. 
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charge."58 Indeed, the Court found other proposed alternatives, 
such as the Solicitor General's suggestion that the exemption be 
extended after impasse "for such time as would be reasonable in 
the circumstances," similarly unworkable.59 
In the end, the Court held that the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tion applied to the employer conduct under examination.60 Such 
conduct "grew out of, and was directly related to, the lawful opera-
tion of the bargaining process. It involved a matter that the parties 
were required to negotiate collectively. And it concerned only the 
parties to the collective-bargaining relationship."61 Consequently, 
the Court concluded, the exemption continued to shelter the uni-
lateral imposition of the employment term.62 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court's holding in Brown is the proper one. In 
order for collective bargaining to work, the parties must be free to 
discuss and decide matters involving wages, hours and terms and 
conditions of employment without the threat of antitrust challenge 
if they are unable to agree.63 Without that assurance, collective bar-
gaining would be subject to the uncertainty that would accompany 
the availability of antitrust review. Plainly put, the players' associa-
tion would have a substantial disincentive to reach an agreement if 
it knew that an antitrust challenge would be available at impasse. 
This would be an unprecedented trump card and fundamentally 
upset the rules and mechanisms of collective bargaining. 
Antitrust principles and labor law principles do not comforta-
bly coexist. 64 The collective bargaining process often involves ac-
tions or agreements which restrain trade in apparent violation of 
the antitrust laws.65 As a result, if collective bargaining is to work, it 
58. /d. The Court also noted that employers would no longer be able to safely 
discuss offers even before impasse. See id. 
59. Id. "[A]ntitrust liability here threatens to introduce instability and uncer-
tainty into the collective bargaining process, for antitrust law often forbids or dis-
courages the kinds of joint discussions and behavior that the collective bargaining 
process invites or requires." /d. 
60. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127. 
61. Id. 
62. ld. 
63. For a discussion of the interaction between labor law and antitrust law, see 
supra notes 9-25 and accompanying text. 
64. For a discussion of the inherent conflict bewteen labor policy and anti-
trust policy, see infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. 
65. For a discussion of such apparent violations of antitrust laws, see supra 
notes 21-25 and accompanying text. 
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must be given free reign, without the shadow of potential antitrust 
examination. The Supreme Court's holding in Brown has accom-
plished that purpose. 
It is true, of course, that the Brown holding puts players in a 
difficult position: if they elect to be represented by player associa-
tions, then they must be "prepared to abide by some of the conse-
quences."66 One of those consequences is that their employment 
terms will be shaped by collective bargaining and not antitrust law. 
If they reject collective representation, as they have occasionally 
done or threatened to do, then recourse to antitrust review re-
mains. Some combination of the two approaches, such as was 
sought in Brown, is not available because it will not work. 
In Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., NFL players had a choice - they 
chose to be represented by a labor organization. The NFLPA on 
their behalf bargained to impasse with the NFL on the issue of de-
velopmental squad salaries, and many other subjects.67 Why at that 
point, should they not be able to lodge their suit? The answer is 
because the players have agreed to fix the terms and conditions of 
their employment through the agency of collective bargaining. 
This was their choice. They had another alternative. They could 
have opted for individual bargaining and retained the availability of 
the antitrust laws to challenge league rules.68 But they rejected that 
choice and chose to be represented. In so doing, they also elected 
to order their employment terms through collective bargaining and 
the labor laws. 
What must be remembered is that the labor exemption pro-
tects the collective bargaining process. 69 Part of that process is that 
sometimes, unfortunately, the parties do not and cannot agree.70 
Under these circumstances, the labor laws establish the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties. And these rules of economic compe-
tition between capital and organized labor are well defined and 
worthy of protection. In its decision in Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 
the Supreme Court has taken a major step towards preserving that 
process. 
66. See St. Antoine, supra note 16, at 631. 
67. Brown v. Pro-Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2119 (1996). 
68. For a discussion of the choice facing employees to bargain individually or 
collectively, see supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
69. For a discussion of how the labor exemption protects the collective bar-
gaining process, see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
70. For a discussion of impasse, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
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